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How should Europe deal politically with its legacy as a so-called “Christian 
civilization”? Should this imply an overt reference to God or to the Christian 
or Judeo-Christian tradition in European constitutional documents (as was de-
bated when the so-called “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” was 
tabled)? This debate raised the old “politico-theological problem”: does a politi-
cal order need some kind of metaphysical or religious grounding, a “soul”, or 
can it present itself as a purely rational order, the result of a utilitarian calculus? 
In this article it is argued that the secular idea of the state as an inherent ele-
ment in the “Judeo-Christian tradition”, for a “divine state” usurps a place that 
is only God’s. So, this religious tradition itself calls for a secular state, and this 
inherent relationship between religion and secularity has become a key element 
for the interpretation of European civilization, most notably in the idea of a 
separation of the church and the state. But the very fact that this is a religious 
idea does imply that the European political order cannot be seen as a purely 
rational political order without a soul. The idea of a “plural soul” is proposed as 
a way out of the dilemma. 
Keywords: Europe, European civilization, Judeo-Christian tradition, political 
order, religion, secularity. 
DOI: 10.3846/2029-0187.2009.2.126-139
1. An old story... 
Hidden somewhere in the Biblical Old Testament (I Samuel, ch. 4) there is a remark-
able story. The people of Israel are caught up in a fight with its archenemies, the Phi-
listines. Israel is losing. But religious people know what to do when they seem to 
lose: try to get God involved. In a holy tent, the tabernacle, far from the battlefield, 
duly protected from all curious glances or sacrilegious actions, there was a richly 
decorated bin, which from the days of old had been the symbol of God’s presence, the 
so-called “Ark of the Covenant”. And now the idea comes up to go and get this bin 
out of its holy tent and bring it to the army camp. The idea is greeted with a great en-
thusiasm: God on our side, we can be sure of victory. The Ark is transported into the 
camp and is thus involved in combat action. Morale is up again. But on the rebound 
the Philistines are aroused by this new enthusiasm on the Israelite side, and they en-
gage in battle with renewed energy, too. It all ends in a complete Israelite defeat – the 
supposed presence of God notwithstanding. Israel has to conclude: apparently, for a 
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few moments God was not where he was supposed to be. He had left the bin. At the 
very moment that God is going to be actively implicated in politics, he apparently 
withdraws. In war Israel gets an experience of the secularity of power.
This old story can be interpreted as a boost for a position that wants to exclude 
religion from the political sphere. No God in a constitution. And seen from the other 
angle: whoever proposes in a political document to give an explicit role to God, or to 
the Christian or Judeo-Christian tradition, has a hard time fitting this story into the 
argumentation. For it is exactly the God of the Old Testament who at the same time 
is the God of the New Testament, who cannot be bribed, who cannot be magically 
manipulated and who does not allow that He himself is used as a vehicle for political 
power. 
2. The soul of Europe?
More than a decade ago Jacques Delors, then president of the European Commission, 
urged European churches: “If we don’t succeed within the next ten years in giving 
a soul to Europe, a spiritual dimension, real meaning, then we will have wasted our 
time. (E)urope cannot live only on the basis of legal argumentation and economic 
knowledge. The potentials of the Treaty of Maastricht will not be realized without 
inspiration of some sort.” (cf. Korthals Altes 1999). 
The problem that comes up here is the so-called “politico-theological problem”1. 
Time and again those in power discover, often to their dismay, that human life has 
deeper dimensions than can be touched upon by politics. People (politicians, perhaps, 
included) rarely feel inspired by politics as such. The struggle for power is often dis-
gusting. The politician, therefore, sets out to acquire respect and devotion of the sub-
jects. Therefore, in every political order “piety“ (pietas) or “reverence” (reverential) 
plays a central role, whether this regards piety for a Pharaoh, for an emperor, for the 
laws of the city or respect for human rights. The need more for a deeper than rational 
adherence to the political order is exactly the reason why those in power look towards 
religion and towards the social and psychological infrastructures of religions with 
jealousy. Religion seems to be able to touch people in places where no king can enter, 
in the heart, in the soul. It seems particularly well equipped to install the fear or the 
respect that is required as a complement to mere self-interest as a basis for the politi-
cal order (which, for example, modern contract theories tend to emphasize). 
1 The term political theology here does not refer to the specific theological movement that originated in the 
1960s with Johann Baptist Metz, Jürgen Moltmann and Dorothee Sölle, and Liberation Theology in Latin 
America. Here, it refers to a specific problem in political theory: the continuous occurrence, the possibility 
and the alleged necessity of a metaphysical undergirding of a political order. The term political theology 
originates in Plato, Politeia, II, 379a, where he speaks of “different patterns of speaking about the gods” (ty-
poi peri theologias). Recently, it has been elaborated in various ways by thinkers as diverse as Carl Schmitt, 
Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss and Claude Lefort. At present, the global resurgence of religion has fostered new 
interest in the subject (see Vries 2006). 
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Regarding the specific relation between politics and the soul, there are different 
roads to travel, each road having its own possibilities and its own obstacles (for a more 
refined typology of relations between religion and the political order see Linz 1996):
a. State-cult or civil religion. The first option is the development of an official state 
cult, as this occurred in Ancient Egypt or in the Roman Empire. Pharaohs and 
emperors can be worshipped as gods2 (Cf. for the state religions in Egypt and 
Mesopotamia, Frankfurt 1978). But even in 18th century “enlightened” France it 
was Jean Jacques Rousseau who argued for a “réligion civile” (Du Contrat Social
IV. 8). This might as well be completely secular, as long as it delivers the goods, 
fostering an attitude of pietas, of “love for one’s civil duties”, to use Rousseau’s 
words. The problem that is encountered along this road is that a state cult is ex-
perienced as too superficial. The cult does not really inspire, it does not touch the 
soul, as the Roman emperors discovered. This must have been at least one of the 
reasons that they in a later phase switched sides and invited Christianity to play 
the role of the official cult of the Empire (Praet 1997); 
b. Alliance. Those in power can also try to forge an alliance with an already exist-
ing, often relatively small but content-wise quite appealing and strong religion. 
The result is a politico-religious alliance: the Persian Empire with Zoroastrian re-
ligion, the Indian empire of Ashoka with Buddhism, the Roman Empire with early 
Christianity, the Frankish empire with Latin Christianity, the Russian empire with 
Orthodoxy; or, on a more national level, Gallicanism and Anglicanism. Or a cer-
tain religion sometimes from the outset can foster an integrating framework for an 
emerging empire, as in early Islam. The problem here is that it is quite uncertain 
whether the adherents of the religion in case are willing to accept this alliance, 
this marriage. Very often the relationship between political and religious leaders is 
very troubling indeed (although this can have surprising consequences as it had in 
European civilization, see below);
c. Separation. The third option is to abandon religion in all its forms out of the public 
sphere. The political order is then presented as being a sphere of strict rationality 
without emotional strings attached, of ratio and not of pietas. This solution has 
been proposed frequently in modern times (and by implication we do not have any 
longstanding practical experience with it). In this case it all comes down to con-
vincing the subjects that the political order is the right one from a rational point of 
view (cf. Rawls 1971): inspiration based on rationalization. The political order has 
to justify itself before the forum of calculating civilians. 
The difficulty here is that the original “politico-theological” problem is somehow 
neglected instead of answered. One has to accept a motivational deficit, what Charles 
Taylor has called the “articulation deficit” of contemporary ethics (Taylor 1989: 53ff). 
This can be remedied by permanently satisfying all possible needs and desires, thus 
resulting more in decadence than in inspiration. But the greatest weakness of this 
2 Until recently the majority of Roman historians, echoing Kurt Latte, considered the importance of the Impe-
rial Cult in classical times to be quite marginal. Thanks to the work of esp. Duncan Fishwick this opinion has 
changed drastically (see Fishwick 1987–1992; Brent 1999). 
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model is its vulnerability, its fragility. A political order “after ideology” that has no 
deeper inspirational infrastructure can quite easily be taken by surprise through the 
rise of charismatic figures who are somehow able to convey the impression that they 
can fill the ideological vacuum.
3. A religious secularity
The second road is the one that traveled mostly throughout European history. After 
Constantine it fell upon Christianity to deliver the inspiring moral framework for the 
Roman Empire, and afterwards for its Western and Eastern imperial heirs. Christian-
ity became the main supplier of political pietas.
But what about the experience of Israel that God can withdraw himself at the very 
moment that he is implicated in a political order? The God of Israel always keeps 
himself at a critical distance from power. According to the Book of Samuel (where the 
passage referred to above is to be found) that in the Christian tradition was a source 
of inspiration for a whole genre of the so-called “Mirrors of Princes”, God is even 
against kingship as such. In the stories every king receives a critical prophet over 
against him: Saul is accompanied by Samuel, David by Nathan, Achab by Elia, Hizkia 
by Isaiah (Voegelin 1956: 224–248, esp. 245ff.).
The Christians showed themselves quite conscious of this old experience of Israel; 
that was a part of the Christian heritage too. They tended to redefine radically the 
concept of pietas: only Jesus Christ should be the object of one’s ultimate allegiance, 
no human being, even if he is the emperor. Peter Brown relates the story of Pontius 
Meropius Paulinus (355–431), a senator from Aquitania, who in a correspondence with 
a pagan friend had redefined pietas as the virtue of being loyal to Christ and Christ 
only (Brown 1997). 
The key figure in this regard is, of course, St. Augustine. In his De Civitate Dei 
he makes a strong distinction between two spiritual directions that human beings can 
take in life, the one characterized by the amor Dei, the other by the amor sui. The 
amor sui is characterized by the manipulative relationships toward one’s fellow hu-
man beings, who are made into objects of domination. The love of God enacts itself 
in an affirmation of one’s fellow human beings, a joyful volo quod sis (I want you to 
exist). And for Augustine, the basic principle of all actually existing political orders, 
especially empires, is the amor sui, the subjection and enslavement of other people 
(De Civitate Dei XIV, 28; cf. De Catechezandis Rudibus 19, 31). This is if anything a 
full-blown depreciation of empire! There is nothing divine to be found in empire as 
such. Augustine, then, proceeds (in book XIX) to make relative judgments about rela-
tively less evil empires and more evil empires, according to the way they treat people, 
especially conquered nations.
Seen from this angle it immediately becomes clear: the experience of the “secu-
larity” of politics in itself can be very well a religious experience and not a secular 
one. The religious experience of the political order as a secular order even predates 
all purely secular accounts by millennia (Cf. O’Donovan 1996; Bruijne 2006). The 
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story told above is to be found within a religious book, read within religious tradi-
tions. All kinds of insights regarding good kingship developed in these traditions. On 
the one hand, within these traditions politics has not become a purely secular affair; 
on the other hand, no political order is a priori sanctified religiously. The key point is 
that power is seen as criticizable and that hence moral criteria have to be formulated 
which allows for the measuring of a political order. This is the road that often has 
been traveled along, both in the Old Testament stories and in the actual practice of the 
Christian Church. 
Just think of the following episode. In early 390 Roman troops, involved in a ma-
jor “pacification operation” in the Greek town of Thessaloniki, did stage a massacre. 
Word about this got out and reached Ambrosius, at that time residing bishop in Milan, 
where the emperor happened to reside often. Ambrosius judged this to be the case of 
excessive violence, especially against women and children. He publicly held the em-
peror accountable. If Theodosius wanted to ally himself with the Christian faith, there 
are some moral-political obligations to fulfill. Ambrosius summoned the emperor to 
publicly confess or otherwise be excommunicated. And emperor or not, Theodosius 
had no choice but to comply, not dressed in his imperial robe, but only in a simple 
penitential garment (McLynn 1994; Brown 1992: 109ff). 
This episode marks an epoch in Western political history. Here is someone who 
the highest power on earth is vested in and, yet, he has to abandon the claim of hav-
ing a privileged entrance towards the divine and hence of being sacrosanct. This reli-
gious “secularization” of politics had far reaching consequences in Europe. Here, with 
all ups and downs a process was started; there, gradually during fifteen centuries, 
the critique of the powers that became a part of those power structures themselves, a 
process in which the critique of politics became a part of politics. 
This road has not been the only one in Western civilization. There was always 
the seducing attraction of a competing political theology that remained very close to 
the ancient imperial theology. So, in Western civilization two conceptions of political 
theology confronted each other. According to the first power emanated directly and 
unconditionally from God into those in power. God and power are indistinguishably 
united. One encounters this type of thinking throughout history, not only in Europe, 
but outside Europe in secularized form as well. It is, perhaps, the world historical 
“default –option” for power presenting itself, its “natural” form. There is no room for 
criticism. Let us call this the A(bsolutist) theology. In this line the concept of “sover-
eignty” becomes a crucial one (Buijs 2003). 
According to the other conception, it is the sacred duty of those in power to con-
stantly remember, both on the level of principle and on the level of practice, that they 
are not God, that they are fallible, that they can function as bearer of power only in 
as far as they honor higher principles. The piety is devoted here to an order of right, 
to which might is subjected. Let us call this the B(inding)-theology or B(oundary)-
theology. This B-theology has caused great but often very creative tensions in the 
course of European history. Its key procedure was the articulation of qualitative, 
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moral, criteria for the political order, the fulfillment of which became conditional for 
the allegiance of the people to the political order.
A very important problem in this respect, of course, is whether it is possible to find 
a place, outside the logics of power, where these qualitative criteria can be articulated, 
a place that is “by nature” free of the longing for dominance, that is “Herrschaftsfrei” 
(to use a Habermassian phrase). The first agent that provided such a place has been the 
Christian Church. One can make a rather strong argument that it has been the histori-
cally first instance of what today is called “civil society”: a place of moral deliberation 
and action that is non-governmental on principle, and yet where authoritative moral 
concepts are formulated that provide a kind of moral framework for the political or-
der. The church assumed the role of providing a platform where a moral debate about 
“good governance” could be conducted and that also was able to convert the outcomes 
of the debate into political pressure (without wanting to replace the political struc-
tures). The term that came to be used for this moral pressure on politics was intro-
duced by Cardinal Bellarminus around 1610 as potestas indirecta, which can still be 
considered to be the mode of operation of civil society. From the eighteenth century 
onward what Jürgen Habermas has called the “public sphere” develops as a critical 
complement to the church, especially in cases where the church has lost its ‘non-gov-
ernmental’ character (Habermas 1991; cf. Gramsci 1971). But throughout modernity, 
and in recent years perhaps even stronger than long before, the Christian church(es) in 
the West (and increasingly in the non-Western world, too) have continued to play that 
role (Casanova 1994: 231ff). 
4. The B-theology in Western civilization
What did this B-theology look like? A first element is the “dedivinization” of power 
(Voegelin 1952: 107ff). Neither emperor nor king is divine. And the implication is: 
power is never to be absolute. 
Secondly: if God does not present himself via hierarchical power structures, this 
does have decisive implications for the relationship between man and God. Apparently, 
this relationship cannot be governed by force. Politics has to recede. In this way, there 
emerges a new awareness of human conscience as a meeting place of God and man, 
that has to be respected by the political order and cannot be entered into from the out-
side. Although this awareness was articulated on principle already by Tertullian and 
Augustine, the political recognition of the so-called freedom of conscience was very 
slow and hesitant. However, during the period of the Reformation and the subsequent 
religious wars, there was an entire tradition of arguments that could be traced back to 
early Christianity on which one could draw if one wanted to defend this freedom. The 
freedom of religious conscience even has become the first officially codified human 
right (article XIII, Treaty of Utrecht 1579; see Vermeulen 1989: 1–73; Schinkel 2007; 
Witte 2007). 
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The third central element is the equality of all people. If God’s dwelling place is 
not primarily with the powerful up high, or even stronger (drawing on the Magnificat) 
and if God “has put down the mighty from their thrones and exalted those of low de-
gree”, all kinds of inequality can no longer be justified on principle. Everybody is a 
dwelling place for the Eternal One (Rist 1982). 
Fourthly, exactly because of the fact that everybody can be a divine dwelling 
place, special care has to be extended towards the weak that easily can get crushed in 
the societal machinery. Caring for the weak, (the poor, widows, orphans, the ill etc.) 
has become a virtue that has been practiced in many ways (the often forgotten and 
often scandalized caritas), and time and again it has been used as a touchstone for the 
justice of a political order. The 19th century Christian-social movement has deep roots 
within the Christian tradition (Brown 2002; Buijs 2008). 
The fifth point concerns the non-hierarchical nature of authority. In the course of 
the Middle Ages the hierarchical conception of authority made headways within the 
Christian tradition. But within the church a struggle, that showed that the Christian 
tradition has other possibilities too, developed. Over against the so-called “papalists”, 
staunch defenders of a hierarchical conception of authority, there emerged a move-
ment of so-called ‘conciliarists’ who were of the opinion that God’s authority was giv-
en to the body of the church as a whole that could be represented by a broad council, 
which in its turn could delegate its authority to a pope. Some important medieval po-
litical thinkers applied this model to the political sphere as well (Morral 1980: 119ff.; 
Ozment 1980: 135–181; Black 1992: 162–185). Inspired partly by conciliarist thinking 
Calvinism has established a model of church-organization from below, a congrega-
tional structure, that later on was applied to the political order as well (Skinner 1978: 
34–47; Berman 2003; Sap 1993). In this respect the Dutch theologian Noordmans has 
stated that Calvin placed the pope in checkmate with the pawn of the congregational 
elder. 
These five elements together are a hidden reservoir of a B-theology, where the 
mainstream of Western society could draw upon. Or else, when this mainstream 
somehow cut itself off from this reservoir and allied itself to a type of A-theology, 
there were all kinds of critical movements in and outside the official ecclesiastical and 
political structures that were able to find their way towards this reservoir and re-open 
it. The emergence of the principles of the rule of law and democracy is unthinkable 
without this reservoir. 
5. Secular? 
The reconstruction just given is not to be interpreted as an attempt to claim Europe 
or the constitutional democracy in general as an exclusively Christian product. I have 
told “a” story about Europe. One can imagine that other stories can be told as well. 
One can tell stories about Europe in which Socrates and Athens hold center stage. Or, 
one can draw quite accusing pictures of all dark connections between the Christian 
tradition and the A-theology (see Moore 1987; cf. Sweetman 2000). In short, there 
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are more stories that can be told. Each of these can show a certain alliance between 
key elements of the central political institutions of Europe with specific religious or 
non-religious worldviews. And there are also critical stories to be told about all kinds 
of violent shortcuts between these political institutions and these religious and non-
religious traditions. 
However, if there is some truth in the picture I have just sketched, at least the 
standard picture of our constitutional democracy being the sole product of rational 
Enlightenment is clearly defective. All kinds of basic intuitions are shaped by and 
became authoritative within a religious context, in this case a Christian context. That 
is particularly true of the insight that politics is not a means of eternal salvation and, 
therefore, has to be limited. Politics is not everything. This “secular” account of poli-
tics is genetically embedded in a non-secular context. The question is whether it can 
survive outside such a context. For the moment, the idea that it can is empirically not 
yet corroborated. Statements to the contrary more than anything else betray a secular-
fundamentalist agenda. It contains an element of risk when one without further argu-
ment just throws up the opinion that we can do away with this religious reservoir of 
resources. It is all yet to be seen. What we have witnessed so far in modernity are sev-
eral very strong movements that have attempted to again vest the political order with 
some ultimate meaning, a strong resurgence of “political theologies” in the sense of 
encompassing ideologies, like Communism and Nazism (Voegelin 1952: 107ff.; Lefort 
1986: chs. 6 and 8). This is not very reassuring for the secularist agenda. 
6. The souls of Europe
The “politico-religious problem” remains central: the motivational weakness of the 
strictly secular. The problem of Europe (not too much different in this respect from 
every modern constitution) is how to combine a certain consciously chosen spiritual 
emptiness with the badly needed sense of loyalty. The idea of one collective soul is 
abandoned and yet, somehow the soul has to be involved in the political order. 
In Germany some people (Habermas is a key spokesman among them) are ex-
perimenting with the idea of “Verfassungspatriotismus”, a sense of collective pride 
regarding the own constitution – an interesting option in the tradition of a “civil re-
ligion”. Which option is advisable for Europe? Presenting Europe as a rational con-
struction, while at the same time relegating all religious and non-religious worldviews 
as publicly irrelevant to the public sphere, will probably end up in a Europe that is 
purely economistic and does not have any moral authority. 
The best option perhaps is, in line with the B-theology, to express openly the im-
passe regarding the political status of the soul and then try to build strength out of this 
weakness. What could this imply for the discussion about a possible European consti-
tution? As a matter of fact, steps in this direction are taken in the pre-amble as it was 
formulated in the now formally abandoned “Constitutional Treaty”. But this could be 
done and should be done in a way that is much less exclusively humanistic.
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Explicitly the awareness of the limits of politics could be expressed. That can be 
done by a reference to “God”, as is proposed from different sides (and those who enjoy 
ridiculing this proposal only show that they do not understand the politico-theological 
problem at all, which might be a dangerous attitude in itself!). But this is problematic. 
Which God? The God of the A-theology or of the B-theology? And would not this im-
ply that, in one way or another, the political order is claimed for one tradition, while 
a modern political order is all about the establishment of spiritual freedom for all, 
according to some of these very same religious traditions? A better option seems to 
be to make clear from the outset that the political order has not set out to reign in the 
souls of the subject, but to ask for a critical commitment of the soul of the Europeans. 
This could result in something like this: 
“Well aware that it is not for a political order to reign in the souls of its inhabit-
ants and impinge upon the spiritual freedom of the people, we acknowledge that the 
central values that we consider binding for the European community are shaped by 
various religious and non-religious value- and virtue-traditions and that for their in-
spiring power they will constantly need the critical support of these traditions. The 
values that the Community has been offered from these various sources and accord-
ing to which standards it constantly should be measured are… (and then follows the 
list that is presented in the preamble as now proposed)”. 
Connected to this can be an open invitation to a permanent, public debate about 
these values and their inspiring sources: 
“Therefore the Union invites representatives of various value- and virtue-traditions 
to formulate jointly and separately (in a way that allows for public accountability) 
in what way Europe can fulfill their requirements for a just political order and to 
present this in a public dialogue to the Union”.
In this way Europe acknowledges openly that it contains not one but at least a 
number of souls. The political order, therefore, cannot be monopolized by one group 
or one tradition, be this Christian or secular. It actually is an “overlapping consensus”, 
a very fruitful idea that comes up in John Rawls’ later work, and which implies, in my 
view, a marked deviation from his earlier work. The idea of an overlapping consensus 
recognizes the positive role that various faith traditions can play in the legitimacy of 
a political order (Rawls 1993). A constitution is a public attempt to draw together a 
number of souls within one political order. In this way it is prevented that a debate 
about the “values” (though a term of dubious quality in itself, there are no easy alter-
natives) of Europe is cut off prematurely by one group who monopolizes the debate. 
7. A Christian Europe?
What should be the answer of representatives of the Christian tradition in Europe to 
such an invitation? There are good reasons to arrive at the position that the Christian 
tradition should refuse to provide for the imperial theology of whichever political or-
der, either on the state level or on the level of Europe. For the Christian tradition there 
is no “holy ground”. 
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However, this “No” is not all there to be said. It would be an indication of a de-
fective sense of responsibility if one just leaves the political order for what it is and 
not show any commitment in regard of the question how and under what conditions 
bridges can be built between the soul of people and European political order. So, the 
clear “No…” has to be accompanied by an equally clear “unless...”. Elements like 
spiritual freedom, the equality before the law of all people regardless of race or sex, 
the protection of human dignity, with special reference to the poor and those in need, 
will be central here. If a political order shows itself to be (relatively) “just”, this has 
to be acknowledged openly. Liturgically for this critical-positive attitude the Christian 
church has two options of prayer and thanksgiving. But the actual relation between 
these two elements has to be critically established anew any moment. This implies 
that the Christian community should practice the art of measurement. 
8. Some against the grain-conclusions
Some conclusions can be drawn; conclusions that may be a bit against the grain of 
current debates. 
a. There is no point in claiming the democratic-constitutional political order as the 
exclusive result of one worldview, be this religious or secular. That would be both 
empirically untenable and politically short-sighted. Seen from the historical per-
spective, the democratic-constitutional state is a unique but at the same time frag-
ile experiment. Therefore, it needs all the support that can be mobilized for it, all 
the pietas it can get, from various sources. In this way a constant debate is waged 
about the “humanizing” potential of the various worldviews, almost a kind of com-
petition. Sometimes this debate will come to the conclusion that there is something 
like an “overlapping consensus” (John Rawls) between various worldviews regard-
ing some elements of the democratic-constitutional tradition, sometimes differenc-
es will come to the fore regarding its sources and regarding the exact measurement 
of its various elements; 
b. For the various worldview traditions to function as a way of generating political 
pietas it is necessary that the different stories are told publicly. Then it may be 
asked to actively and openly mark their position within the democratic-constitu-
tional state and develop something as a “public theology”. Such theology indicates 
how on the basis of one’s own tradition one will operate within the public sphere, 
given that no tradition is allowed to claim a “theocratic” monopoly. As a matter of 
fact I did something like this for the Christian tradition (albeit in a very rudimen-
tary way) by sketching the B-theology; 
c. Is every tradition to the same extent able to develop such a public theology? 
Traditions are never static or unequivocal. I illustrated the point already by dis-
tinguishing between an A-theology and a B-theology, that are both present within 
the Christian tradition (although I am inclined to say that B is more representative 
of “true” Christianity than A). Whoever searches from the 17th to the 19th century 
Orthodox-Catholicism for a public theology in the sense just adumbrated will not 
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find very much (one would have to go back almost to Augustine and Thomas). 
However, in the 20th century there developed “théologie nouvelle” and “human-
isme intégral” (Jacques Maritain), that deeply influenced a very influential council 
(speaking about conciliarism!), Vaticanum II. Pope John Paul II became one of 
the most outspoken defenders of human rights and based on this new personalism 
showed himself to be very critical both of communist totalitarianism and of con-
temporary processes of worldwide economization.3 At an earlier stage Calvinism 
developed the elements of public theology. In the Netherlands in the 19th century 
these elements are unfolded further by the Calvinist Abraham Kuyper who aban-
doned all theocratic ambitions and became a staunch defender of a plural society 
(Heslam 1998; Bratt 1998). Exactly in this way he was able to launch a non-utopi-
an, realistic, “architectonic” critique of society. Whether inside Islam such a public 
theology as a bridge towards the constitutional democracy can be developed as 
well is one of the most pressing questions of this moment. There are some attempts 
in that direction, but there is no question that there are many signals that point in 
the opposite direction (see Casanova 2001);
d. It is counterproductive to force upon religions a modern Western type of 
Enlightenment before allowing them in the public sphere. That would be somewhat 
like asking every tradition to produce its own heretics that undermine that self-
same tradition, or in short: to abandon oneself. A credible public theology can only 
be developed by those that remain somewhat connected to “orthodoxy”. Whoever 
requires the internal secularization of religions as an entrance-ticket for the public 
sphere is probably more involved in settling private accounts with “religion” than 
in furthering the common good of the “commonwealth”. 
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Kaip politine prasme Europa turėtų pasielgti su savu vadinamuoju „krikščioniš-
kosios civilizacijos“ palikimu? Ar šis palikimas turėtų atvirai nurodyti Dievą 
arba krikščionišką ją, arba žydišką ją-krikščionišką ją, tradiciją, aptinkamą 
konstituciniuose Europos dokumentuose (kai buvo svarstoma pateikta vadi-
namoji „Sutartis dėl Konstitucijos Europai“)? Ši diskusija iškėlė seną „politi-
nę-teologinę problemą“: ar politinei santvarkai reikia tam tikro metafizinio, ar 
religinio pamato, „sielos“? O gal ta politinė santvarka gali būti suprantama kaip 
grynai racionali tvarka, kaip utilitarinės apskaitos rezultatas? Šiame straipsnyje 
įrodinėjama, kad sekuliarios valstybės idėja yra neatsiejama nuo „žydiškosios-
krikščioniškosios tradicijos“, dėl „Dievo valstybės“ uzurpuojanti paties Dievo 
vietą. Tad ši religinė tradicija reikalauja sekuliarios valstybės, o nesuardomas 
religijos ir sekuliarumo santykis tapo kertiniu akmeniu Europos civilizacijos 
interpretacijoje, labiausiai išryškėjančiu bažnyčios ir valstybės perskyros idė-
joje. Tačiau pats faktas, kad ši idėja yra religinio pobūdžio, leidžia teigti, jog 
politinė Europos santvarka negali būti vertinama kaip grynai racionali politinė 
santvarka, neturinti sielos. „Grynosios sielos“ idėja čia siūloma kaip galimas 
išeities taškas, sprendžiant minėtą dilemą. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Europa, Europos civilizacija, žydiškoji-krikščioniškoji 
tradicija, politinė santvarka, religija, sekuliarumas. 
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